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Interview With Tengiz Pkhaladze on Recent Developments in Moldova and Georgia
By: Fredrik Erixon Tengiz Pkhaladze
Subjects: European Union Russia & Eurasia
Fredrik Erixon interviewed Tengiz Pkhaladze, a Senior Fellow at ECIPE, about the recent developments in Moldova and Georgia, two countries on the path to the EU membership, where important elections have recently been held.
Fredrik Erixon: The past two weeks have featured two quite important political events in Moldova and Georgia. Moldova has voted on its EU accession referendum on 20 of October, and a presidential election on 3 of November which resulted in re-election President Maia Sandu for another four years. On 26 of October, during the parliamentary election in Georgia, the Georgian Dream Party won its fourth term in office, though it has been contested with significant evidence of voter fraud. In both countries, what seems to have been on the ballot is the question of whether they should orient themselves towards the EU and aim for full membership. Would you say that’s a fair description of the events? And can you walk us through what happened? Let’s start with Moldova.
Tengiz Pkhaladze: Yes, I think that’s quite a fair description of the situation, both in Georgia and Moldova. Though in Moldova we had a referendum and in Georgia, an election, both cases relate to each country’s further orientation and integration with the EU. Let’s start with Moldova, as I think the Moldovan case was particularly significant, especially considering the referendum process and all the challenges Maia Sandu’s government faced, including preliminary results questioning the choice of the Moldovan people.
Ultimately, Moldova adopted a European path, albeit with a narrow margin in the referendum favoring Europe. Maia Sandu also faced significant challenges in this election process, but she won. This is crucial for the country’s future development, as it opens more opportunities for the next steps. As the negotiations are now open, it’s up to Moldova and Maia Sandu’s government to demonstrate their progress through commitments, deliverables and significant reforms.
Though the elections are over in Moldova, the process continues, as Moldova is a parliamentary country, not a presidential republic. In a few months, Moldova will hold another election for parliament, which may be even more significant than the presidential one. All the lessons from this referendum and presidential election should be taken into account, considering internal and external challenges and the potential for external forces to interfere in the election. Moldova still faces substantial challenges, but they have completed a significant chapter and advanced their position towards the EU integration.
All the lessons from this referendum and presidential election should be taken into account, considering internal and external challenges and the potential for external forces to interfere in the election.
Fredrik Erixon: Speaking of Moldova, do you think the presidential election, which appears to have resulted in a clear win for Maia Sandu, indicates the country’s determination to move forward with its EU accession?
Tengiz Pkhaladze: I would say that it proves the majority of Moldovan society supports the EU integration process. They’ve given Maia Sandu this mandate, but much work remains to be done to strengthen the readiness of society to accelerate the EU integration process, deliver more visible results, and engage people in more proactive ways.
Although Maia Sandu won the election, this narrow margin shows that the challenges she faces have not disappeared. They may even increase, particularly during the upcoming parliamentary election. This is why Western-oriented political forces should learn from this process and be better prepared for the parliamentary election. This election and process are not merely domestic affairs—they have geopolitical implications for Moldova and Eastern Europe as a whole. So, we must consider all internal and external challenges carefully.
Fredrik Erixon: Let’s turn to Georgia and the recent election there. How would you describe the outcome, and what’s the current situation?
Tengiz Pkhaladze: The situation in Georgia is even more complicated. This election reflects Georgia’s ongoing political trajectory and a critical moment in its relationship with the EU and the United States. Never before has Georgia’s European aspiration or its commitment to becoming a European country been questioned so strongly. Moreover, the recent report from the European Commission, clearly state that Georgia’s EU integration process is frozen due to missteps by the Georgian government, specifically the Georgian Dream Party. Paradoxically, the Georgian Dream Party claims victory in this election and will hold power for a fourth term, which is unprecedented in Georgian history.
Despite their claim to victory, there is widespread disappointment among the public, and allegations of election fraud. Over 23,000 observers, mostly volunteers, monitored the process closely. This led to extensive documentation of irregularities by the election commission and ruling party. Georgia now faces both internal and external legitimacy challenges. Internally, a significant portion of society feels disappointed and disputes the election result. Externally, only a few countries, including Hungary, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, have recognised the election. It’s very important to note that two reputable international organisations conducted exit polls, and the differences between the exit poll results and the official results were substantial. In statements from these organisations, they claimed it was statistically impossible for the official results, as declared by the electoral commission, to be accurate. Additionally, the political parties that participated in the election have declared they will reject their seats in parliament, which will significantly call into question the legitimacy of the new parliament. Meanwhile, Georgia’s key strategic partners urge the ruling party to provide international access to review the election data.
In addition, Georgia’s president has officially declared the election a fraud, stating she will not recognise the results. This has made the situation highly complex and uncertain. Protests continue, and it’s hard to predict where this process will lead. On one hand, we see a society committed to European values; on the other, a parliamentary election result that indicates otherwise. Now, it’s up to Georgian society and political forces to decide whether to legitimise this election.
Now, it’s up to Georgian society and political forces to decide whether to legitimise this election.
Fredrik Erixon: It sounds like a very complicated situation indeed. Aside from the internal turmoil in Georgia, there’s also the matter of its EU accession, which has been suspended. No progress has been made, and Brussels has raised serious questions about Georgia’s future with the EU, especially given the current government’s stance. Do you think developments in the accession negotiations will influence the situation in Georgia?
Tengiz Pkhaladze: That’s a crucial question. As in Moldova, the issues in Georgia go beyond internal disputes and have broader geopolitical implications. Last year’s decision by the EU to grant candidate status to Georgia was wise, as it limited opportunities for Russian propaganda that suggested Europe would never open its doors to Georgia. Now, Georgians understand that their future lies in their own hands—the door to the EU is open, but they must decide whether to enter. This means they must protect their European choice, which is extremely important.
At the same time, the question remains: is the situation only temporarily frozen, or should we expect further problems and a deterioration in the relationship between the EU and Georgia? If the Georgian Dream Party continues its current approach in the government, all of Georgia’s progress in EU integration could be at risk. Discussions are already underway in Brussels about potentially suspending visa provisions for Georgian citizens and re-evaluating relationships. Important EU programs in development, security, cyber defence, and other areas are now in question. Sweden, one of Georgia’s major supporters, has already announced to cut ties with the Georgian government. This situation is problematic for both Georgia and the EU, as Georgia has long been a reform frontrunner and committed to European values.
Projects with the European Union, like the Middle East-West Corridor, or another energy security and fiber-optic initiatives with potential to be transformed into wider digital support, all based on trust and shared values between the parties, are now threatened. If these fundamental values are questioned, so are all the achievements Georgia has made. On the other side, the U.S. also plays a role in this, as Washington has indicated it may reassess its relationship with Georgia, and sanctions against Georgian officials are being considered by the Senate. These developments are alarming for Georgia and its international partners, as Georgia’s geographic position makes it vital to European security and stability.
Fredrik Erixon: To what extent do you think decisions in Brussels or Washington could influence Georgia’s geopolitical choices? The Georgian Dream government, like many others, seems to think it can pursue EU membership while maintaining a confrontational stance with the West, due to its close ties with Moscow. However, this approach may soon face consequences if Western governments start retracting resources and collaborations. Do you think this would affect how Georgians view their geopolitical choices?
Tengiz Pkhaladze: This is a major concern for Georgian society, which very well understands these challenges and sees the recent elections as a referendum on the country’s future. That’s why protests continue to draw large crowds. The Georgian Dream Party has overestimated the value of the Middle Corridor and the situation that has developed following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. On one hand, it’s true that the significance of Georgia and the Middle Corridor has increased. However, we must remember—and the Georgian government should remember—that all of this value comes from the unwavering support of the West for Georgia’s statehood, security, and the investment in developing infrastructure and institutions.
Georgia doesn’t have many geopolitical options—since independence, it has developed as a European country, aspiring to join the European family. Right now, there isn’t a geopolitical alternative for Georgia. Either it becomes a European, independent democracy or it risks falling under Russia’s influence once again. Georgian society is unlikely to accept any shift in geopolitical alignment, and the entire economy is highly integrated with Europe, making any shift challenging without drastic and painful measures. This isn’t just about parliamentary seats; it’s about the country’s future. It’s about the future of society. I don’t believe there is a society that would easily give up and accept such drastic political changes.
Right now, there isn’t a geopolitical alternative for Georgia. Either it becomes a European, independent democracy or it risks falling under Russia’s influence once again.
When it comes to the actions or reactions of our partners, the country’s destiny ultimately depends on the will of its people and citizens. If Georgian society demonstrates that they will fight for the country’s European future—if they show their commitment and protect the country’s development as a European democracy, by all constitutional means—then I believe Brussels and the United States must be extremely supportive of Georgia’s aspirations.
At the same time, we are dealing with significant challenges from Russian influence, disinformation, and financial manipulation, which are very active in Georgia. My message to the West is that as long as Georgian society shows its commitment to European values, they should not be left alone or abandoned.
Fredrik Erixon: Returning to Moldova, and following our discussion on Georgia, let’s consider the approaches European governments, as well as Brussels, might take towards Moldova. Given the upcoming parliamentary election season in Moldova, are there additional actions Europe can take to strengthen its influence in the region and support EU-oriented forces?
Tengiz Pkhaladze: I think it’s extremely important now to clearly demonstrate the benefits of European integration, as Moldova has already reached a more advanced level in this process. The people of Moldova—the citizens—need to understand the tangible benefits this integration brings. This isn’t just about political statements; every citizen voting for the country’s future should know exactly what European integration means.
I believe the EU has enough mechanisms to effectively wield its soft power in Moldova, especially among the younger generation, who are strongly committed to the European path. Supporting Maia Sandu’s government through economic reforms, developing new programs in education, and enhancing infrastructure is essential. At the same time, it’s critical to support the government in countering hybrid threats, such as disinformation and psychological operations conducted by Russia, particularly around sensitive areas like Transnistria, to prevent any escalation or conflict.
Of course, much also depends on Ukraine, as the situations in Moldova and Georgia are ultimately linked to developments in Ukraine. Supporting Ukraine in this struggle is essential to prevent Russia from creating new dividing lines in Europe and to avoid the re-emergence of an “Iron Curtain.”