Events

Russia recently joined the World Trade Organisation. The accession negotiations have been long and controversial, and there have been doubts in Russia as well as in other countries about the merits of having Russia inside the WTO. But now that the accession has concluded successfully, it is time to look at how to make the best of Russia’s entry. Is this an opportunity for larger reforms in Russia’s economic and commercial policy? Will it deliver on its promises to liberalise its economy? Should Europe fear that Russia will be a disobedient member of the WTO club? And what should be EU’s strategy for Russia’s membership in the WTO – and, beyond, bilateral relations to deepen economic integration?

It is said that we live in the Age of Asia. And it is in many ways true. With weak growth in Europe and the U.S., the world economy is increasingly relying on the continental economic awakening in Asia to continue. Yet rapid changes in the world economy, and the structure of world economic power, seldom take place without political friction. Managing a country’s relative economic incline can be as difficult as managing an economy’s relative decline.

Trade liberalisation in the post-war era was to a large extent driven by mercantilist instincts. A provocative observation for a free-trade purist, perhaps. Nonetheless, successful forms of negotiated trade liberalisation were based on an exchange of “concessions”, or reciprocated market access for exporters. The modern world economy, however, does not operate in accordance with the mercantilist textbook. The past decades of globalising supply chains have made it difficult to distinguish the national identity of a product and what exactly represents an export gain.

In our series of events on EU-Asia relations, ECIPE is pleased to invite you to a conversation with Søren Kelstrup, Head of Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark and Ambassador for Trade Policy.

In 1900 the global average life expectancy at birth was 31 years. By 2000 it was 66. Yet, alongside unprecedented improvements in longevity and material well-being, the twentieth century also saw the rise of fascism and communism and two world wars followed by a cold war.

The nineteenth century was a period of rapid economic growth characterised by relatively open markets and more personal liberty, but it also brought great inequality within and between nations. The following century offered sharp challenged to free-wheeling capitalism from both communism and fascism, whose competing visions of planned economic development attracted millions of people buffeted by the economic storms of the 1930s.

A plurilateral agreement between a group of willing economies is to an increasing extent being suggested as a possible way forward in order to advance liberalisation and co-operation in the field of services.

Can commitment to Green policy and the rules of open trade sit nicely together? In a new paper, Fredrik Erixon argues they can, but not if industrial policy and promotion hide behind environmental policy. Green protectionism is not about environmental policy, but about using such policies for other purposes. Erixon surveys in the paper the EU’s policy for biofuels and renewable energy, and concludes that core elements of thatpolicy looks more like industrial promotion than a genuine desire to rapidly shift away energy from fossil fuels.

With African leaders now calling for a continental free trade area by 2017, to boost trade within the continent, a new World Bank report shows how African countries are losing out on billions of dollars in potential trade earnings every year because of high trade barriers with neighboring countries, and that it is easier for Africa to trade with the rest of the world than with itself.

The cornerstone of EU trade policy towards developing countries is the system of tariff preferences. Now that system is under reform, and the European Parliament’s Trade Committee recently affirmed, with some notable revisions, the Commission’s original idea to cut back on the number of countries that are granted preferential access to the EU market. Countries such as Russia, Brazil and Saudi Arabia will be excluded as the number of beneficiaries is slimmed down. It will also shrink the import that now enters the EU at preferential tariff rates, which has prompted critical comments from development agencies.

The expansion of global value chains has a major impact on international trade. New trade patterns are not so much about trade in goods as trade in tasks. Trade in intermediate inputs accounts for a considerable part of total trade, and that share has been growing at a remarkable speed in the past decade. What are the sources of this increase – and to what extent are new global value chains global or regional in nature? And what does the rise of global value chains means for competition?