The resilience of liberalism: two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

“The battles for decency and truth are among the most important political battles of our time, and the adjective liberal is our most important weapon.”

Michael Walzer, 2023

February  24^th, 2024, marked the second anniversary of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Tellingly, few imagined that a war in the 21^st century, using drones and other modern weaponry, could be fought on old assumptions such as nationalism and imperial territorial claims, as the distinguished historian Margaret MacMillan noted. In Putin’s eyes, a world without Russia’s political and military influence simply couldn’t exist. Yet, although Putin may be using history to justify this war, ironically, it’s because he knows his Russia has no place in the modern world. With a faltering economy relative to other global powers, the only way to regain dominance (in his rationale) was by force. For almost three decades now, the global economy has been reconfiguring towards three centres of production: Asia, North America and Europe. For the latter, the fall of the Berlin Wall opened the door to the European integration project for Eastern Europeans. And with Ukraine’s promising accession to the European Union, this liberal democratic undertaking will be reinforced.

A Gloomy 2024

The EU and its allies’ coordinated response to the imposition of sanctions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had three concrete objectives: to isolate the Russian economy from international markets, make it more difficult for Moscow to finance and profit from the war, and ultimately to exert sufficient pressure to end its belligerent campaign. However, the war indirectly served to remind this liberal coalition of its sense of purpose. Europe’s joint diplomatic response revived the conception of unity and the need for a robust and cohesive European foreign policy. Recently, the EU extended its economic sanctions against Russia for another six months. This diplomatic exercise was carried out just days after the IMF published its world economic outlook, showing that Russia’s economy is expected to grow at 2.6% in 2024 and 1.1 % in 2025. While in principle, this may suggest the ineffectiveness of sanctions, the reality is more complex, as economic sanctions take a long period to unfold.

The EU rightly believes it must become a strong and autonomous actor to face future challenges. Against the clock, the EU has transformed its energy policy and reduced its dependence on Russia – something unthinkable just a few years ago. But if the EU is to succeed in decoupling from Russia, and stop imports of banned goods, it needs to engage and involve a wider range of international allies. According to some reports, Brussels is preparing to impose for the first time extra-territorial measures on foreign companies. And while there’s some logic that sanctioning third countries might be a more effective way to tackle the circumvention of restricted goods, there’s a big risk that such measures might backfire and alienate potential allies.

Russia’s resilience to sanctions and its recent territorial gains are among the most substantial reasons why many argue the future looks bleak for Kyiv. Undeniably, Europe is entering into a war fatigue, and public support for Ukraine has started to fade. With the upcoming elections to the European Parliament looming in June, regional support for Ukraine could become tortuous, especially if protests by European farmers continue to escalate. Ukraine is one of the world’s leading agricultural producers, and some European farmers are anxious about the possibility of a large influx of grains into the Union. For this reason, some EU Members have expressed opposition to Ukraine’s accession unless trade restrictions on some agricultural goods are implemented.

On the other side of the Atlantic, as the US military focus shifts again towards the Middle East, the war in Ukraine is now contesting for military aid in the US Congress, where about half of Republicans think the US is providing too much funds.  With the upcoming US election at the end of this year, the average American will wonder why their country should be financing distant wars. And although this internal dilemma between internationalism and isolation has existed since America’s founding, Donald Trump, the GOP frontrunner for the presidential nomination, has funnelled the isolationist sentiment into a key element of a reloaded America First. A return of Trump to the White House will bring cataclysmic challenges not only to Ukraine’s security but to the whole world.

A New Hope

Certainly, with such bleak prospects, it is hard to predict scenarios that would tip the balance towards Ukraine, let alone a possible solution to the war. But while the empire might strike back, a new hope for the liberal alliance must awaken. Consider this. Despite Russia’s economic growth prospects for 2024 –mainly attributed to defence expense spending, Moscow is relatively weaker today than before the start of the war. In a previous ECIPE blog, we showed that during the antebellum period, labour productivity levels in Russia’s industrial sector were significantly lower than in the US and EU, i.e. the Russian economy needed five workers to do the job of one US factory worker. As a result of the war, it is estimated that one million workers have left the labour force. Russia is facing its biggest labour shortage in nearly three decades, a brain drain particularly acute in the IT sector. These significant changes in the labour market will have a major impact on its future growth. One of the most essential elements of sustained economic growth is how much output can be obtained from the interaction between technology and different forms of capital, especially human capital. The labour crunch, combined with Moscow’s difficulty in acquiring high-tech goods (even if it bypasses some Western export controls), will gradually diminish the size of Russia’s economy.

In terms of alliances, Moscow has become a geopolitical dwarf. There’s no significant global coalition or forum led by Russia. It has not even increased its influence in fora where it holds a membership. Take the case of the BRICS, one of the most prominent anti-establishment economic blocs. Judging by its recent expansion and the countries invited to join, it is gradually becoming a platform for promoting China’s multilateral interests rather than a coalition building an alternative international order. Furthermore, BRICS+ countries have contradictory and opposing foreign policies, and while economic interests may temporarily unite them, international politics and global alliances work because they are coalitions based on a common set of values.

Of course, neither Russia nor the enormous implications of its veto power at the UNSC must ever be underestimated. However, this may also work against Moscow rather than in its favour. There’s no more serious strategic mistake than making current decisions based on overestimated capabilities driven by nostalgia for the great days of yore. Despite Putin’s rhetoric on the decay of liberal values, the facts show a different picture. At the UN, the vote against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicates that an overwhelming majority of states are committed to respect for the law, sovereignty and the preservation of the integrity of nations as necessary conditions for a peaceful world. Liberalism may have different connotations depending on the context and where you are in the world, but one indisputable feature of a liberal project is that majorities respect the rights of minorities, and the current international order is built on those ideals.

This is the way

Europe, like America, is also subject to internal dilemmas and contradictions. Stefan Zweig and Ortega y Gasset were both contemporaries who witnessed the destruction of Europe and its transition to a new world. In the grip of nostalgia for yesterday, Zweig concluded that the decline of Europe must coincide with the demise of his own life. The Spaniard, while also concerned about the drift of the masses, saw the unity of Europe as the only path to perpetuity. Surely, the war in Ukraine has brought back a past that was thought to be forgotten. But contrary to woeful outlooks, the devastation caused by this war has opened up new political cleavages that are becoming the cause and struggle of new generations.

Wars rarely go as planned, but if the Western alliance is to succeed, it must commit to its core liberal principles and democratic values. Undoubtedly, one of the biggest challenges in the coming years will be the EU’s enlargement and the accession of Ukraine by 2030. And much of that undertaking will rest on the individual decisions of an electorate increasingly sceptical about the importance of cross-border integration. But if there is a lesson to be learned from the return of History, it is that each enlargement stage has made Europe stronger, and that times of crisis have bequeathed the world’s bravest leaders. Today’s politicians should be up to that task by conveying to their electorates a reality that not only do the ills come from the outside, but so do the solutions.  To paraphrase (and slightly twist) a great statesman’s quote: this generation of Europeans – and anyone who calls themselves a liberal – has a rendezvous with destiny. Thereby, if you, dear reader, are lucky enough to live in a democracy in 2024, have a good think about how you will vote.