While the EU’s coordinated response to the Kremlin’s attack on Ukraine has been effective with sanctions or energy… https://t.co/MrC1rXYb5U📌 New webinar - Save the date!
Join our discussion on the future of the #UK trade policy.
📆 14 June
🕥 9:30 CET… https://t.co/YZqoov6OvuFor companies to remain competitive while going green – and for the broader carbon transition to happen – there is… https://t.co/p5ZisVS4uJ🔴 LIVE NOW: The Economic Impacts of the Reform of the EU’s Product Liability Directive
Tune in to our webinar wi… https://t.co/4oTXnUIEPfUK Trade Policy needs a reset. To help achieve this, @DavidHenigUK introduces a framework based on three principles… https://t.co/WMvIAGUPTL
Because of concern that OECD tariff reductions will translate into worsening export performance for the least developed countries, trade preferences have proven a stumbling block to developing country support for multilateral liberalization. We examine the actual scope for preference erosion, including an econometric assessment of the actual utilization, and also the scope for erosion estimated by modeling full elimination of OECD tariffs and hence full MFN liberalization-based preference erosion. Preferences are underutilized due to administrative burden—estimated to be at least 4 percent on average—reducing the magnitude of erosion costs significantly. For those products where preferences are used (are of value), the primary negative impact follows from erosion of EU preferences. This suggests the erosion problem is primarily a bilateral concern.