This blog post is based on an article published in El País on the 18th of October 2026. The original article can be found here.
Economic dependence becomes a geoeconomic vulnerability when alternatives are scarce. Europe has seen several examples in recent years: face masks during the pandemic; Russian gas after the invasion of Ukraine; and, this year, Washington’s decision to temporarily restrict foreign access to Anthropic’s most advanced artificial intelligence models. The past cannot be changed. But lessons can be learnt to prevent history from repeating itself.
The first lesson is that imports are not synonymous with vulnerability. Before reaching that conclusion, policymakers must assess the concentration of supply, the scope for substitution and the cost of doing so. In 2023, the European Commission identified 204 products in sensitive ecosystems for which the EU depends predominantly on foreign suppliers. Yet, this reliance is not necessarily a strategic threat. The task is to reduce critical dependencies while avoiding self-sufficiency policies that would impose heavy costs and inefficiencies.
The second lesson, then, is that diversity is a virtue. Dependence can be reduced: Russia’s share of EU gas imports, for instance, fell from 45 per cent to 12 per cent in 2025. ‘Your future hasn’t been written yet. No one’s has. Your future is whatever you make it. So, make it a good one’, says Doc Brown in Back to the Future Part III. In this context, greater autonomy is not about making everything oneself; it is about having alternatives. Europe did not seek energy autarky. Instead, it diversified gas suppliers, strengthened regasification and storage infrastructure, and developed other energy sources. Policies to achieve economic security should give Europe scope to broaden its options, build new capabilities and ensure that no single supplier can dictate its choices.
The third lesson is that competitiveness is a source of power and must be strengthened. Europe relies on other countries for certain minerals and metals, pharmaceutical ingredients, energy and technologies. But other countries rely on European capabilities: ASML for semiconductor manufacturing, Nokia and Ericsson in telecommunications, and Novo Nordisk for pharmaceuticals. Dependence runs in both directions. Managing it shows policymakers that trade wars cannot be won without cost. If we ceased supplying one another, everyone would lose. Therefore, true economic resilience rests on diversification but also on innovation, business competition and technological development.
Just as the DeLorean gave Marty McFly a route to the future, investment in economic competitiveness will allow Europe to engineer its own future. The challenge lies in mapping these chokepoints: understanding upon whom we depend and equally important who depends upon us, across which sectors and products. Europe should not be a supporting player in value chains; it should help determine how they evolve.
In today’s great-power competition, competitiveness matters not only for economic growth. It also determines the ability to withstand pressure and respond to economic coercion. Europe will become less vulnerable when it has alternative markets from which to buy and assets that other countries need. Such interdependence benefits all sides and serves as a powerful deterrent against the weaponisation of trade. Going back to the future does not mean turning back. It means learning from the past to ensure that Europe’s economic future is not decided by others. That can only be achieved by European companies developing cutting-edge technologies and securing positions in critical tasks that are hard to replace.