📢 Be sure to join our new webinar!
Tune in our upcoming online conversation on business and politics in China with… https://t.co/ZDXmJPhs9L🌎🚢 IP-intensive sectors export 68% of all EU exports. Stronger IP provisions in EU FTAs can lead to an increase of… https://t.co/Nr6oolhcYJ"The same hawks who are usually (and rightly) dogmatic about Chinese market distortions are now fiercely advocating… https://t.co/SGZ8FU3RMiIs China closing itself? How are new business restrictions causing friction? What are the secrets for success in Ch… https://t.co/RVXLXdyxUq"In the debate about shortages and trade dependencies, which is legitimate and relevant, international trade has be… https://t.co/VQrq5gY4GK
This paper examines how WTO member governments have used safeguards, antidumping, and other instruments of “administered” or “contingent” protection in the management of domestic pressures for protection. Three conclusions emerge from the examination:
• These provisions have been extensively used but at the same time have remained under discipline. Application of the restrictions they allow has been minimal relative to the liberalization the GATT/WTO system has supported.
• Reform-minded developing country governments have employed these rules skillfully to support their own liberalization programs.
• Antidumping is perhaps the classic example of a pragmatically successful flexibility instrument with pretensions – but no more than pretensions – to a real economic rational.