Database

In February 2012, Pakistan’s information technology minister invited bids for deployment of a national internet filtering system. Citizen Lab determined that the Pakistani government has been using filtering software supplied by Canadian firm Netsweeper since 2013.

UNESCO reports that, in 2017, Pakistani authorities imposed internet and mobile network shutdowns in different parts of the country at least 17 times. Cell phone networks were shut down on five occasions in Islamabad and Rawalpindi alone. These, along with complete media shutdowns, occurred as a response to political unrest. Shutdowns are common practice in Pakistan since 2005, and reportedly occur mostly over religious and national holidays, as well as mass protests and political rallies.

Between 2012 and 2016, the government has blocked YouTube in response to the anti-Islamic video “The Innocence of Muslims”. The site was briefly unblocked in December 2012 until a broadcast journalist demonstrated that the offensive clip was still available.
Pakistan's telecoms regulator said the ban was no longer necessary because Google, which owns YouTube, had now launched a Pakistan-specific version.

It is reported that instances of state blocking and filtering of the internet have increased since 2005. In particular, the Blasphemy Law has resulted in instances of blocking websites and social media, eg. Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Reports show that 20,000 to 40,000 websites are blocked annually.

Section 38 of Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act limits civil or criminal liability for service providers for content posted by users, unless it is proven that the service provider had “specific actual knowledge and willful intent to proactively and positively participate” in cybercrimes committed under the Act. There have been concerns regarding lack of clarity, particularly with regards to what constitutes "willful intent."

Besides being regulated by contractual terms, data collated by banks, insurance firms, hospitals, defence establishments and other "sensitive" installations/institutions cannot be transferred to any individual/body unless it is transferred with the permission of the relevant regulator or similar bodies on a confidential basis. Additionally, in certain cases data cannot be transferred without the permission of the relevant client/customer.

The prevention of Electronic Crimes Act mandates that breaches of the confidentiality of information shall result in imprisonment which may extend to three years.

Although the transfer of data to third parties is not specifically regulated under the laws of Pakistan, data cannot be transferred to a country which is not recognized by Pakistan.

Currently, the list of countries not recognized by Pakistan include: Israel, Taiwan, Kosovo, Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, South Ossetia and Armenia. This list may change from time to time.

Furthermore, data can only be transferred to India if such a transfer can be justified by the transferor.

For intra-corporate transferees (ICT), contractual service suppliers (CSS) as well as independent service suppliers (ISS), there are limitations of stay which are not specified and whose duration is set on a case-by-case basis.

Moreover, for most business services including computer services, ICTs must belong to an internationally reputable company.

The incumbent operator, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd (PTCL), is a state owned enterprise.

The telecommunication sector in Pakistan is deregulated and liberalized. However, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd (PTLCL) still owns the access to the last mile infrastructure.

Under the Copyright Ordinance of 1962, certain acts are not considered an infringement of copyright. The exceptions include fair dealing for purposes of research or private study, criticism or review.

Pakistan is not a member of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). However, there are no complaints found relating to patent application processes for foreign applicants.

Pakistan is not a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, but has recently attained an observer status.

Although there are no documented official “buy national” policies, it is reported that procuring agencies can provide suppliers with price preferences according to government policy. Price preferences of up to 25% are in place on all government purchases depending on domestic value added content. The maximum preference requires at least 35% domestic value added.