#### Post-crisis state of play

- Global economic/trade trends
- Indian political economy
- Indian trade policy

- The global economy and trade policy post-crisis
- -- Long globalisation boom to 2007: technological innovation, policy liberalisation, catch-up growth
- GEC: sharp growth contraction and deglobalisation; Shift to the East – much stronger rebound in Asia/emerging markets
- Shift in policies, esp. domestic crisis interventions worse medium-term consequences for West than emerging markets
- -- Emerging protectionism: very little up-front protectionism; rather creeping regulatory protectionism; parallels with 1970s

#### Indiatpisaconfnov10\_Slide 3: GDP Growth and Growth Estimates (Africa)

	2008	2009	2010			
Advanced economies	0.2	-3.2	2.7			
Africa	4.4	2.8	4.6			
Developing Asia	7.7	6.8	9.4			
Western Hemisphere	4.2	-1.7	5.7			
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010						

## Indiatpisaconfnov10\_New: GDP Growth Rates and Estimates 2008-2011


European Union	0.8	-4.1	1.7	1.7		
France	0.1	-2.5	1.6	1.6		
Germany	1.0	-4.7	3.3	2.0		
United Kingdom	-0.1	-4.9	1.7	2.0		
United States	0.0	-2.6	2.6	2.3		
Brazil	5.1	-0.2	7.5	4.1		
China	9.6	9.1	10.5	9.6		
India	6.4	5.7	9.7	8.4		
Russia	5.2	-7.9	4.0	4.3		
BRICs	6.6	1.7	7.9	6.6		
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010						

#### **Trade Volumes**

	2008		2009		2010		2011	
	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export
Advanced Economies	0.4	1.9	-12.7	12.4	10.1	11.0	5.2	6.0
Emerging/ Developing Economies	9.0	4.6	8.2	-7.8	14.3	11.9	9.9	9.1

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2010

## FDI inflows, global and by groups of economies, 1980-2009 (billions of dollars)



**Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010** 

**Top 10 biggest targets of discriminatory measures** 

Top 10 Targets		discriminatory nposed on target	Number of pending measures, which if implemented, would harm target too		
	This report (June 2010)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (2nd GTA report)	This report (June 2010)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (2nd GTA report)	
China	282	183	125	48	
EU27	266	na	80	na	
USA	213	127	46	27	
Germany	204	120	56	26	
France	188	110	46	22	
UK	181	109	44	24	
Italy	175	105	50	27	
Belgium	170	92	42	21	
Japan	168	90	47	24	
Netherlands	163	92	42	24	

Note: Unfortunately when our second report was prepared data on the total number of times the EU 27 nations were harmed was not collected, hence frustrating direct comparisons between early June 2010 and early September 2009. Data on EU27 was reported from the third report on due to requests from users. Moreover, individual member state information in this table may indicate the extent how often some European trading nations have been harmed since the Pittsburgh summit.

Source: Evenett (2010), see footnote 17

### Crisis measures – which countries have inflicted most harm?

	М	etric, Country in spe	ecified rank, Numb	per	
Rank	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed	Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	
1.	EU27 (146)	Venezuela (784)	EU27 (55)	EU27 (168)	
2.	Russian Federation (73)	Kazakhstan (719)	Algeria (54)	Argentina (161)	
3.	Argentina (41)	Nigeria (599)	Nigeria (45)	China (161)	
4.	India (31)	EU27 (437)	Venezuela (38)	Indonesia (152)	
5.	Germany (29)	Russian Federation (421)	Kazakhstan (36)	Russian Federation (142)	
6.	UK (24)	India (347) Indonesia (347)	Russian Federation (34)	Finland (132) Germany (132) South Africa	
7.	Indonesia (22)	Indonesia (347)	Ethiopia (32)		
8.	China (19)	Ethiopia (345)	Indonesia (32)	(132)	
9.	Italy (19)	Argentina (336)	India (31)	Belgium (131) Brazil (131)	
10.	Austria (17)	China (335)	Germany (27)		

Note: There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.

The EU27 refers to the sum of all of the measures taken by the 27 national governments of the European Union and the measures taken by the European Commission. To be included in this total a state measure must have involved discrimination against the commercial interests of another state, including potentially another member of the European Union.

Source: Evenett (2010), see footnote 17

## Trade and Globalisation after the Crisis

#### A review of the troops

- USA
- EU
- China
- Japan
- India
- Russia
- Brazil
- WTO and G20

## Trade and Globalisation after the Crisis

#### Conclusion

- -- Shift to East undeniable; grounds for emerging-market, esp. Asian, optimism
- Western decline, Asian/emerging market rise but still a leadership vacuum
- Short-term challenges: containing policy deterioration and emerging protectionism
- Medium-term challenge: get back on track with liberalisation, structural reform and globalisation

- Indian political economy post-crisis
- -- Strong crisis performance and recovery based on domestic consumption; stable government in Delhi
- -- Optimistic scenario: growth up to 10% plus, even without big reforms; India emerges as global economic/political power
- -- Domestic and trade reforms stalled since 2004
- -- Growth concerns: less benign global economy; lack of reforms
- -- Without reforms no big transformations in agriculture, services and industry
- A second-tier emerging power; not in league of China can't export global order

#### Prospects

- -- What the govt. needs to do; what it can do politically
- -- Priority reforms:
- A) Prevent deterioration of fiscal deficit; avoid new trade restrictions, subsidies, price controls
- B) Road map for repair of public finances, narrow the deficit
- C) Reduce and simplify industrial tariffs and cut red tape on trade/investment procedures
- D) Public-private partnerships for infrastructure: implement on fast track
- E) Reduce FDI caps in insurance, banking, education, retail
- F) Remove price controls on petroleum

What won't be reformed in short/medium term

- -- Agriculture
- -- Labour markets
- -- Property rights
- -- Retail (?)
- -- Capital controls
- -- Energy

Indian political economy (cont.)

- -- The silver lining: good prospects in some states and a ripple effect
- -- Message: Look at India bottom-up, not topdown; don't expect too much from Delhi


#### INDIA

 A snapshot of India's trade and foreign direct investment (FDI); trade policy


-- Big liberalisation and globalisation since late 1980s

 Gap has narrowed, but still higher protection than in China, E Asia and other emerging markets


#### India2009(1)\_Sld33:Trade (Goods and Services) / GDP in percentages for BRIICS (1980-2009)




#### India2009(1)\_SId35:Total Trade (Goods and Services) in bln US\$ for BRIICS (1980-2009)




#### India2009(1)\_Sld36:Current Account Balance in US\$ bln for India and China (1995-2010)




#### India2009(1)\_Sld37:Current Account (% of GDP) for India and China (1995-2010)




# India2009(1)\_SId38:Share of Exports of Word Trade in Goods & Services exc. Intra-EU 27 trade (2009)




# India2009(1)\_Sld39:Share of Imports of Word Trade in Goods & Services exc. Intra-EU 27 trade (2009)



#### India2009(1)\_SId40:Share of Exports in World *Merchandise Trade* (excl. Intra-EU27 trade) 2009




#### India2009(1)\_Sld41:Share of Imports in World *Merchandise Trade* (excl. Intra-EU27 trade) 2009




## India2009(1)\_SId42:Share of Exports in World

Services Trade (excl. Intra-EU27 trade) 2009




## India2009(1)\_Sld43:Share of Imports in World


Services Trade (excl. Intra-EU27 trade) 2009




## India2009(1)\_Sld44:Exports of Goods and Services (bln of US\$) in India (1995-2009)




#### India2009(1)\_Sld46: Share of Total Accumulated World *OFDI Stock* (1980-2009)






#### India2009(1)\_Sld47: Share of Total Accumulated World *IFDI Stock* (1980-2009)

1980-2009




#### India2009(1)\_SId48: Share of Total Accumulated World *OFDI Flows* (2007-2009)

2007-2009




#### India2009(1)\_Sld49: Share of Total Accumulated World *IFDI Flows* (2007-2009)


2007-2009



## India2009(1)\_Sld50: Inward FDI flows for BRIICS in bln US\$ (1980-2009)




## India2009(1)\_Sld52: Outward FDI flows for BRIICS in bln US\$ (1980-2009)




### India2009(1)\_Sld63: Applied Tariff Rates in Asia (WTO)

Country/ Economy	Year	Tariff Binding Coverage in %	Simple Average Final Bound (All goods)	Simple Average Applied Tariff (Manufacture )	Simple Average Applied Tariff (Agriculture	Simple Average Applied Tariff (All Goods)	Trade Weighted Average (All goods)	Maximum MFN Applied Duties
EU	08/09	100,0	5,2	3,9	13.5	5,3	2.9	166
US	08/09	100,0	3.5	3.3	4.7	3.5	2.0	350
China	08/09	100,0	10.0	8.7	15.6	9.6	4.3	65
India	08/09	73,8	48.5	10.1	31.8	12.9	6.0	246
Japan	08/09	99.7	5.1	2.5	21.0	4.9	2.0	641
Korea	08/09	94.6	16.6	6.6	48.6	12.1	8.3	887
Taiwan	08/09	1000	6.4	4.5	16.6	6.1	1.9	853
Hong Kong	08/09	45.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Singapore	08/09	69.7	10.4	0	0	0	0	95
Malaysia	08/09	84.3	24.0	7.6	13.5	8.4	6.3	>1000
Indonesia	08/09	95.8	37.1	6.6	8.4	6.8	4.1	150
Philippines	08/09	67.0	25.7	5.8	9.8	6.3	5.9	65
Thailand	08/09	75.0	28.2	8.0	22.6	9.9	4.3	132
Vietnam	08/09	100.0	11.4	9.7	18.9	10.9	6.5	145

## India2009(1)\_Sld66: Use of AD Measures by by BRIICS - except Russia (1995-2006)




# India2009(1)\_SId67: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Scores for BRIICS - excl. Indonesia (1 = closed, 0 = open)




#### **Trade Restrictiveness Banking**

**OECD Trade Restrictiveness Index for BRIICS in Banking** 




## **Trade Restrictiveness Insurance**

#### **OECD Trade Restrictiveness Index for BRIICS in Insurance**




### **Trade Restrictiveness Fixed Telecom**

OECD Trade Restrictiveness Index for BRIICS in Fixed Telecom




### **Trade Restrictiveness Mobile Telecom**

**OECD Trade Restrictiveness Index for BRIICS in Mobile Telecom** 



## **Trade Restrictiveness Distribution**

**OECD Trade Restrictiveness Index for BRIICS in Distribution** 



#### India2009(1)\_Sld73: World Ranking Ease of Doing

Rusiness (2011) Ease of Startin **Dealing** Registe Getting **Protec Paying Trading Enfor** Closing Doing with ring Credit ting Across cing **Taxes** g **Busines** Constr. **Property Borders Contract Investors Business** а **Permits Busine** S S Singapore H-Kong US Denmark Korea Japan Thailand Malaysia Vietnam China Indonesia Russia Brazil India 

Philippines

1/10

#### India2009(1)\_Sld74: Indicators for Trading Across Borders (2011)

	Ease of Trading Across Borders (World Ranking)	Documents for export (number)	Time for Export (days)	Cost to Export (US\$ per container)	Documents for Import (number)	Time for Import (days)	Cost to import  (US\$ per container)
Singapore	1	4	5	456	4	4	439
H-Kong	2	4	6	625	4	5	600
Denmark	5	4	5	744	3	5	744
Korea	8	3	8	790	3	7	790
Thailand	12	4	14	625	3	13	795
us	20	4	6	1,050	5	5	1,315
Japan	24	4	10	1,010	5	11	1,060
Malaysia	37	7	18	450	7	14	450
Indonesia	47	5	20	704	6	27	660
China	50	7	21	500	5	24	545
Philippines	61	8	15	675	8	14	730
Vietnam	63	6	22	555	8	21	645
India	100	8	17	1,055	9	20	1,025
Brazil	114	8	13	1,790	7	17	1,730
Russia	162	8	36	1,850	13	36	1,850

## India2009(1)\_Sld75:The Enabling Trade Index

(2010)

Country Overall Rank		Market Access		Border Administration		Transport and Communications Infrastructure		Business Environment		
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
Singapore	1	6.06	1	5.97	1	6.56	7	5.74	2	6.00
H Kong	2	5.70	16	5.12	6	5.96	5	5.79	5	5.94
Denmark	3	5.41	95	3.76	3	6.22	8	5.71	3	5.96
US	19	5.03	62	4.17	19	5.60	11	5.49	37	4.86
Japan	25	4.80	121	3.20	16	5.65	14	5.45	34	4.91
Korea	27	4.72	111	3.63	24	5.24	15	5.37	44	4.65
Malaysia	30	4.71	31	4.71	44	4.57	24	4.95	51	4.59
China	48	4.32	79	3.87	48	4.53	43	4.13	41	4.74
Thailand	60	4.13	113	3.48	41	4.61	40	4.19	71	4.24
Indonesia	68	3.97	60	4.21	67	3.99	85	3.28	60	4.42
Vietnam	71	3.96	50	4.41	88	3.46	68	3.62	64	4.34
India	84	3.81	115	3.42	68	3.98	81	3.34	58	4.48
Brazil	87	3.76	104	3.72	80	3.70	66	3.64	83	4.00
Philippines	92	3.72	64	4.13	74	3.82	83	3.31	103	3.61
Russia	114	3.37	125	2.68	109	2.99	48	4.00	92	3.79

## **INDIA**

### Multi-track trade policy

- -- Incremental, stop-go unilateral liberalisation now stalled
- Marginal backsliding: food and fuel inflation; global economic crisis and trade-restrictive measures
- -- India and the WTO: weak commitments (unlike China); conservative/defensive in DDA
- -- India and PTAs: foreign-policy thrust; trade-light

## **BOX 2: Multi-track trade policy**

	Unilateral liberalisation	Multilateral liberalisation	Regional/bilateral liberalisation	Role of donors/policy conditionality
Brazil	Strong (1988/89-94). Little thereafter	Weak. But very active in WTO	Weak. Very active with PTAs. Trade-light PTAs	Weak
India	Incremental since 1991	Weak. But very active in WTO	Ditto	Weak Except IMF package 1991
China	Strong (1990s)	Very strong WTO commitments. Active in WTO (but low-key in DDA)	Ditto	Weak
Indonesia	Strong (mid1980s- early 1990s)	Weak. Defensive in DDA	Weak. Mainly ASEAN FTAs. Relatively trade-light PTAs	Mixed. Japanese aid in 1980s, IMF package 1998
South Africa	Rand crisis 1996. Little thereafter	Strong Uruguay Round commitments. Defensive in DDA since Cancun	Weak. Very active with PTAs. Trade- light PTAs	Weak
Russia	Stops and starts in 1990s. Weak since 2003/4. Some reform reversal	Not yet acceded to WTO	Trade-light PTAs in CIS	IMF packages in 1990s

#### India2009(1)\_Sld77: Recently Established or Proposed RTAs/ CEPAs by India (2000-2010)

Trading Partners	Nature of Agreement	Status of Agreement 2010		
Singapore	FTA	Agreement in force		
Sri Lanka	FTA	Agreement in force		
APTA	FTA	Agreement in force		
Bhutan	FTA	Agreement in force		
Nepal	FTA	Agreement in force		
SAFTA	FTA	Agreement in force		
Bhutan	FTA	Agreement in force		
Canada	EPA	Proposed		
Thailand	EPA/ FTA	Framework Agreement signed		
ASEAN	FTA	Agreement in force		
BIMSTEC	FTA	Framework Agreement signed		
SACU	FTA	Framework Agreement signed		
MERCOSUR	FTA	Agreement in force		
GCC FTA		Framework Agreement signed		
New Zealand	FTA	Under Negotiation		

# India2009(1)\_Sld78: Recently Established or Proposed RTAs/CEPAs by *India* (2000-2010) cont.

	Agreement in force
PTA	Agreement in force
CEPA	Proposed
FTA	Proposed
BIPA & FTA	Proposed
FTA & CEPA	Agreement in force
CEPA	Under negotiation
EPA/ FTA	Under negotiation
FTA	Proposed
EPA/ FTA	Proposed
PTA	Under negotiation
FTA	Under negotiation
FTA	Under negotiation
	CEPA  FTA  BIPA & FTA  FTA & CEPA  CEPA  EPA/ FTA  FTA  EPA/ FTA  PTA  FTA

#### India2009(1)\_Sld78: Recently Established or Proposed RTAs/ CEPAs by India (2000-2010) cont

Indonesia	EPA/FTA	Proposed
Israel	FTA	Proposed
Turkey	FTA	Proposed
Uruguay	FTA	Proposed
Venezuela	FTA	Proposed
Nepal	FTA	Agreement in Force
CEPEA/ASEAN+6	EPA/FTA	Proposed

## **INDIA**

- Political economy of Indian trade policy
- -- Crises
- -- Interests
- -- Institutions
- -- Factor endowments
- -- Foreign policy

#### **BOX 1: The Political Economy of Trade-Policy Reforms**

	Crisis-induced liberalisation	Country size (population)	Interests	Ideas (Washington Consensus)	Institutions	Factor Endowments	Foreign policy
Brazil	Yes (1988/89-94). Political and economic system- change	Large	Diverse. Mixed preferences. Export-oriented business better mobilised, especially agriculture	Strong in macroeconomic policy, weaker in liberalisation/structural reforms	Democratic politics. Federal system. Strong trade-policy capacity. MEA lead. Weak involvement of MOF except in crisis	Land/ resource abundant	Emphasis on South-South alliances to counterbalance US power under Lula
India	Yes (1991-93). Political continuity	Very large	Diverse. Mixed preferences. Business gradually more open- economy oriented, especially IT services	Ditto	Multi-party coalition politics. Federal system. Strong trade-policy capacity. MOCI lead. Weak involvement of MOF except in crisis	Labour abundant	Reorientation of policy from early 1990s. Look West (USA and Europe) and Look East (ASEAN and China)
China	No. Gradual reform. Political continuity	Very large	Mixed preferences. MNEs lobby effectively to contain protectionism	Strong across macro and microeconomic policy, weaker in structural reforms. Industrial-policy intervention mixed in.  Overall policy pragmatism	Authoritarian politics. Strong trade-policy capacity. Centralised decision-making. MOFCOM lead	Labour abundant	Constructive engagement with major powers (esp. USA). Soft power in east Asia. Regional Stability
Indonesia	Yes (1966-68, mid 1980s, 1998). Political system-change 1998	Large	Diverse. Mixed preferences. Export-oriented lobbies relatively weak. More influence for unions and NGOs after Asian crisis	Strong in macroeconomic policy (Berkeley Mafia), weaker in liberalisation/structural reforms	Democratic politics since 1998. Decentralisation to provinces. Weak trade-policy capacity. Institutional instability and policy-making divisions after Asian crisis	Resource/ labour abundant	Close relations with USA and US security umbrella during Soeharto period
South Africa	Yes (mid 1990s). Political and economic system- change	Medium	Diverse. Mixed preferences. Open-economy business muted. Protection-seeking firms, unions and NGOs more vocal	Ditto. Industrial-policy intervention now more popular	Democratic politics. Decision-making centralised in Executive. Shallow trade-policy capacity. DTI lead. Little MOF involvement	Resource abundant	Reorientation of policy with end of apartheid. Leadership in Africa. Now more emphasis on South-South alliances
Russia	Yes (1990s). Political and economic system-change. More authoritarian politics and partial reform reversal since 2003/4	Large	Energy interests very strong. Symbiotic links with the state. Monopolistic/ oligopolistic markets. The new nomenklatura	Ditto. Partial liberalisation reversal and more industrial-policy intervention	Authoritarian democracy under Putin. Recentralised decision-making. Shallow trade-policy capacity	Resource abundant	Colder relations with the West. Attempt to dominate "near abroad". Aggressive energy politics

## **INDIA**

Conclusion

-- Forward and backward races

-- Prospects for trade and other economic reforms