


INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- Global value chains
- Global value chains, Asia and regional integration
- What policy implications?


INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- Global value chains
 - From “traditional” trade to the Great Unbundling; “made in one country” to “made in the world”; “trade in goods” to “trade in tasks”
 - Measuring international trade flows: gross values vs. value-added; latter more accurate reflection of who benefits
 - The world of Apple: iPods, iPhones, iPads





Source: Meng & Miroudot

“Smiley Face”: conceptual model of the shift to a high value added, globally integrated, services economy



Source : Business Week International online extra, May 16, 2005, Stan Shih on Taiwan and China






| US trade balance in iPhones with: | CHN | TWN | DEU | KOR | ROW | World |
|-----------------------------------|--------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| Gross | -1,646 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1,646 |
| Value added | -65 | -207 | -161 | -800 | -413 | -1,646 |

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- Global value chains (cont.)
 - Increasing foreign value-added in exports – tighter connection between imports and exports
 - High services content in value-added of manufacturing exports
 - Alters picture of bilateral trade balances
 - Regional production hubs in GVCs: NAFTA, EU and Factory Asia




3.1. No surprise: contents of domestic value-added rises with natural resource endowments and country size




3.4. Exports require imports

Transport equipment




Electronics






3.5. ... a significant share of total intermediate imports is used in exports






3.2. Services matter, whether considered by country...

Services Value-Added: % of exports, 2009






3.3. ...or by industry






3.6....and Value-Added often returns






3.7. China – changes in balances





3.8. Japan – changes in balances


value-added minus gross, USD millions, 2009





3.9. US – changes in balances

value-added minus gross, USD millions, 2009



INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- GVCs, Asia and regional integration
 - East Asia: intra-regional trade substantial and growing; increasing intra-regional FDI
 - East Asia highly dependent on “processing” trade/regional production networks (esp. ICT); driving force of increasing intra-regional trade, esp. parts and components
 - But linked tightly to extra-regional final markets; *increasing* dependence on them
 - Partial, skewed integration; contrast with W. Europe and N. America

Intra-Regional Trade Share 1980–2006 (%)

| Region | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| NIE (4) ² | 8.6 | 9.2 | 11.9 | 15.5 | 15.5 | 15.3 | 15.8 | 15.2 | 14.6 | 13.9 | 13.6 |
| ASEAN (10) ³ | 17.9 | 20.3 | 18.8 | 24 | 24.7 | 24.1 | 24.4 | 26.6 | 26.7 | 27.2 | 27.2 |
| ASEAN + PRC; Korea; Hong Kong; Teipei (14) | 22.7 | 27.2 | 33 | 39.1 | 40.6 | 41.1 | 43.4 | 44.7 | 45.2 | 45.5 | 45.8 |
| ASEAN + 3 (13) ⁴ | 30.2 | 30.2 | 29.4 | 37.6 | 37.3 | 37.1 | 37.9 | 39 | 39.2 | 38.9 | 38.3 |
| ASEAN + 3 + Hong Kong + Teipei (15) | 36.8 | 39 | 43.1 | 51.9 | 52.1 | 51.9 | 53.8 | 55.4 | 55.9 | 55.4 | 54.5 |
| ASEAN + 6 (16) ⁵ | 34.6 | 34.8 | 33.7 | 40.8 | 40.5 | 40.6 | 41.3 | 42.4 | 43 | 43.1 | 42.6 |
| ASEAN + 6 + Hong Kong + Teipei (18) | 40.5 | 42.7 | 46.3 | 54.5 | 54.6 | 54.5 | 56.3 | 57.7 | 58.5 | 58.4 | 57.6 |
| NAFTA (3) | 33.8 | 38.7 | 37.9 | 43.1 | 48.8 | 49.1 | 48.4 | 47.4 | 46.4 | 46.1 | 44.3 |
| MERCOSUR | 11.1 | 7.2 | 10.9 | 19.2 | 20.3 | 17.9 | 13.6 | 14.7 | 15.2 | 15.5 | 15.7 |
| Old EU (15) | 60.7 | 59.8 | 66.2 | 64.2 | 62.3 | 62.2 | 62.5 | 63 | 62.2 | 60.4 | 59.5 |
| New EU (27) | 61.5 | 60 | 66.8 | 66.9 | 66.3 | 66.7 | 67.4 | 68.1 | 67.6 | 66.2 | 65.8 |

Sources: Masahiro and Wignaraja (2008)

Emerging East Asia's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows, 1995–2005

| | FDI Source | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|----------------|
| FDI Inflows to ¹ | United States | European Union | Japan | NIEs | ASEAN 9 | Total | |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | \$ million |
| NIEs | 16.8 | 15.8 | 8.1 | 5.2 | 3.9 | 100 | 437,999 |
| Hong Kong | 5.1 | 7.4 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 1.8 | 100 | 215,999 |
| Korea, Rep of | 22.4 | 40.1 | 13.3 | 4.1 | 7.4 | 100 | 55,975 |
| Singapore | 31.7 | 19.3 | 8.5 | 4 | 5.8 | 100 | 142,748 |
| Taipei | 19.9 | 13.1 | 15.5 | 14.2 | 2.5 | 100 | 23,277 |
| ASEAN 9 ² | 18.4 | 29.1 | 19.1 | 29.2 | 4.2 | 100 | 116,413 |
| Indonesia | 5.7 | 50.9 | 3.3 | 15 | 9.3 | 100 | 11,839 |
| Malaysia | 27.4 | 23.4 | 13.6 | 22 | 2.1 | 100 | 44,651 |
| Philippines | 23.4 | 10.3 | 23.1 | 16.9 | 1.1 | 100 | 13,709 |
| Thailand | 10.5 | 10.5 | 25.1 | 27.6 | 0.9 | 100 | 37,428 |
| Vietnam | 4.8 | 19.1 | 14.4 | 39.2 | 6.6 | 100 | 18,225 |
| China | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 54 | 1.6 | 100 | 537,163 |
| Total | 13.9 | 14.7 | 10.5 | 34.9 | 3.1 | 100 | 992,516 |

Sources: Masahiro and Wignaraja (2008)

Table 3: Intra-regional shares of Manufacturing Trade: Total, Parts and Components, and Final Trade (%), 1994/5 and 2006/07¹

| | East Asia ² | Developing East Asia ² | ASEAN+3 ² | ASEAN | NAFTA | EU15 |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Total manufacturing ³ | | | | | | |
| a: Total Exports | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 47.15 | 38.15 | 15.25 | 20.7 | 44.35 | 61.15 |
| 2006-07 | 43.85 | 33.35 | 21.85 | 18.4 | 48.1 | 56.85 |
| Imports | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 58.15 | 34.85 | 42.95 | 15.5 | 36.3 | 64.1 |
| 2006-07 | 64.4 | 46.7 | 49.25 | 20.75 | 31.95 | 57.85 |
| Trade (exports + imports) | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 52 | 36.5 | 27 | 17.75 | 39.9 | 62.6 |
| 2006-07 | 52.1 | 40 | 30.4 | 20.05 | 38.4 | 57.35 |
| b: Parts and components | | | | | | |
| Exports | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 50.2 | 42.55 | 33.65 | 30.3 | 43.5 | 62.25 |
| 2006-07 | 61.1 | 53.9 | 35.3 | 25.4 | 46.85 | 55.9 |
| Imports | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 65.85 | 35.3 | 39.55 | 20.15 | 39.45 | 58 |
| 2006-07 | 66.9 | 50.85 | 47.8 | 22.85 | 39.9 | 55.15 |
| Trade | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | | | | | | |
| 2006-07 | 57 | 38.7 | 35.4 | 24.2 | 41.35 | 60.1 |
| c: Final goods ⁴ | | | | | | |
| Exports | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 46 | 36.75 | 11.4 | 16.1 | 44.7 | 60.9 |
| 2006-07 | 36.85 | 28.3 | 16.95 | 15.9 | 48.65 | 57 |
| Imports | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 55.4 | 34.65 | 43.4 | 12.85 | 35.25 | 65.55 |
| 2006-07 | 62.95 | 42.75 | 50.15 | 20.55 | 30.15 | 58.45 |
| Trade | | | | | | |
| 1994-95 | 50.25 | 35.7 | 25.4 | 14.3 | 39.4 | 63.15 |

Notes

1 See Notes to Table 1 for details on country classification. SITC classification numbers are given in brackets

2 Intra-regional trade shares have been calculated excluding bilateral flows between China and Hong Kong

3 SITC 5 to 8 less 68

4 Total (reported) – parts and components

Source: Compiled from UN Comtrade database , and Trade Data CD-ROM, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taipei (for data on Taiwan)

Share of Network Products in Manufacturing Trade, 2009/10 (%)


| | Parts and components | Final assembly | Total network trade |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| (a) EXPORTS | | | |
| Developing East Asia | 35.2 | 27.3 | 62.5 |
| China (PRC) | 25.7 | 32.5 | 58.2 |
| Taiwan | 44.2 | 25.6 | 69.8 |
| Korea, RP | 43.2 | 28.4 | 71.6 |
| ASEAN | 44.7 | 24.8 | 69.5 |
| Indonesia | 21.54 | 17.7 | 39.1 |
| Malaysia | 54.6 | 22.2 | 78.8 |
| Philippines | 73.3 | 14.5 | 87.8 |
| Singapore | 49.5 | 17.2 | 66.7 |
| Thailand | 30.1 | 34.3 | 64.4 |
| Viet Nam | 11.2 | 7.6 | 18.8 |
| India | 12.3 | 4.2 | 16.5 |
| Developed countries | 25.2 | 23.6 | 48.8 |
| Developing countries | 47.3 | 44.5 | 55.6 |
| World | 29.2 | 23.6 | 52.8 |
| (b) IMPORTS | | | |
| Developing East Asia | 42.2 | 17.1 | 61.3 |
| China (PRC) | 44 | 19.8 | 63.7 |
| Hong Kong, China | 48.5 | 13.5 | 62.1 |
| Taiwan | 38.9 | 16.8 | 55.7 |
| Korea, RP | 31.9 | 17.4 | 49.3 |
| ASEAN | 47.9 | 16.2 | 64.1 |
| Indonesia | 21.8 | 15.8 | 37.7 |
| Malaysia | 50 | 22 | 72 |
| Philippines | 61.3 | 17.4 | 78.6 |
| Singapore | 60.4 | 17.3 | 77.7 |
| Thailand | 36.1 | 12.4 | 48.5 |
| Viet Nam | 19.1 | 9.7 | 28.5 |
| India | 22.9 | 17 | 39.9 |
| Developed countries | 23.4 | 25.5 | 48.9 |
| Developing countries | 33.6 | 19.9 | 53.5 |
| World | 27.3 | 23.3 | 50.7 |

Source: Athukorala (2011)


INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- GVCs, Asia and regional integration (cont.)
 - South Asia
 - Tiny shares of Asian and world trade; hardly inserted into global supply chains
 - Most malintegrated region in the world: intra-regional trade approx. 4% of total trade; 2% of regional GDP


Share of World Trade (US\$ Bn)




Share of World Trade (US\$ Bn)




Inward FDI Stock (US\$ Bn)




Inward FDI Stock (US\$ Bn)



Intra- and Extra-Regional Trade, 2008



Intra-Regional Trade as a Share of GDP, 2008



INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- What policy implications?
 - Logic of GVCs: open borders, non-discrimination, secure property rights and ease of doing business
 - Makes a nonsense of mercantilist trade policy; “beggar thy neighbour” means “beggaring thyself”
 - Transforms political economy of trade policy
 - Increasing costs of discriminatory industrial policy

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- Policy barriers to GVCs
 - Tariffs
 - Customs procedures/delays at the border
 - Standard-setting
 - Services
 - FDI

Figure 3 Trade politics changed: Protectionism became destructionism






Figure 1: Tariffs on the gross value and the domestic value-added of exports, 2009*

Agriculture



Manufacturing



* Applied AVE tariffs, weighted by the share of each sector and destination market in the country's agricultural or manufacturing exports. For EU countries tariffs are calculated on extra-EU exports.


| | Ease of Trading Across Borders (World Ranking – DB 2013) | Documents for export (number) | Time for export (days) | Cost to export (US\$ per container) | Documents for import (number) | Time for import (days) | Cost to import (US\$ per container) |
|----------------------|--|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Singapore | 1 | 4 | 5 | 456 | 4 | 4 | 439 |
| Hong Kong SAR, China | 2 | 4 | 5 | 575 | 4 | 5 | 565 |
| Japan | 19 | 3 | 10 | 880 | 5 | 11 | 970 |
| South Korea | 3 | 3 | 7 | 665 | 3 | 7 | 695 |
| Taiwan | 23 | 6 | 10 | 655 | 6 | 10 | 720 |
| Malaysia | 11 | 5 | 11 | 435 | 6 | 8 | 420 |
| Thailand | 20 | 5 | 14 | 585 | 5 | 13 | 750 |
| Brunei | 40 | 6 | 19 | 680 | 6 | 15 | 745 |
| Vietnam | 74 | 6 | 21 | 610 | 8 | 21 | 600 |
| Indonesia | 37 | 4 | 17 | 644 | 7 | 23 | 660 |

| CONTINUED..... | Ease of Trading Across Borders (World Ranking – DB 2013) | Documents for export (number) | Time for export (days) | Cost to export (US\$ per container) | Documents for import (number) | Time for import (days) | Cost to import (US\$ per container) |
|----------------|---|----------------------------------|---------------------------|--|----------------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Philippines | 53 | 7 | 15 | 585 | 8 | 14 | 660 |
| Cambodia | 118 | 9 | 22 | 755 | 10 | 26 | 900 |
| Laos | 160 | 10 | 26 | 2140 | 10 | 26 | 2125 |
| Myanmar | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| China | 68 | 8 | 21 | 580 | 5 | 24 | 615 |
| Sri Lanka | 56 | 6 | 20 | 720 | 6 | 19 | 775 |
| Pakistan | 85 | 8 | 21 | 660 | 8 | 18 | 705 |
| Nepal | 171 | 11 | 41 | 1975 | 11 | 38 | 2095 |
| Bangladesh | 119 | 6 | 25 | 1025 | 8 | 34 | 1430 |
| India | 127 | 9 | 16 | 1120 | 11 | 20 | 1200 |

The Enabling Trade Index (2012) – Top 10 Countries

| Country | Overall Rank | | Market Access | | Border Administration | | Transport and Communications Infrastructure | | Business Environment | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-------|---------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|---|-------|----------------------|-------|
| | Rank | Score | Rank | Score | Rank | Score | Rank | Score | Rank | Score |
| Singapore | 1 | 6.14 | 1 | 6.20 | 1 | 6.53 | 1 | 6.06 | 5 | 5.75 |
| Hong Kong SAR, China | 2 | 5.67 | 10 | 5.08 | 4 | 6.02 | 3 | 5.85 | 7 | 5.75 |
| Denmark | 3 | 5.41 | 67 | 3.90 | 3 | 6.22 | 8 | 5.75 | 4 | 5.77 |
| Sweden | 4 | 5.39 | 67 | 3.90 | 2 | 6.35 | 17 | 5.42 | 2 | 5.88 |
| New Zealand | 5 | 5.34 | 25 | 4.74 | 6 | 5.99 | 25 | 5.00 | 10 | 5.63 |
| Finland | 6 | 5.34 | 67 | 3.90 | 7 | 5.88 | 9 | 5.60 | 1 | 5.96 |
| Netherlands | 7 | 5.32 | 67 | 3.90 | 5 | 6.00 | 2 | 5.92 | 14 | 5.47 |
| Switzerland | 8 | 5.29 | 56 | 4.08 | 12 | 5.69 | 10 | 5.56 | 3 | 5.82 |
| Canada | 9 | 5.22 | 27 | 4.68 | 15 | 5.62 | 21 | 5.21 | 15 | 5.38 |
| Luxembourg | 10 | 5.20 | 67 | 3.90 | 21 | 5.37 | 6 | 5.78 | 6 | 5.75 |

Figure 5: Reducing supply chain barriers has a larger effect than removing tariffs



The GDP effect of reducing supply chain barriers is much higher than for tariffs

*Based on export value; includes only the effect of "Border Administration" and "Telecommunication and Transport Infrastructure".

Source: Ferrantino, Geiger and Tsigas, The Benefits of Trade Facilitation - A Modelling Exercise. Based on 2007 baseline.

Figure 6: Impact per region varies under the ambitious scenario




Table 1: Ambitious scenario

| | Ambitious scenario <i>(Countries raising their performance halfway to global best practice)</i> | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | Increase in GDP (%) | Increase in exports (%) | Increase in imports (%) |
| Total | 4.7 | 14.5 | 14.9 |
| Oceania | 4.3 | 0.5 | 2.2 |
| China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan | 7.6 | 30.6 | 33.8 |
| Japan | 2 | 10.9 | 2.9 |
| Korea | 4.9 | 8.8 | 8.9 |
| South-East Asia | 9.3 | 12.1 | 18.4 |
| South and Central Asia | 8 | 65.2 | 49.3 |
| US and Canada | 2.8 | 11.3 | 6.7 |
| Mexico | 4.4 | 11.2 | 26.3 |
| Brazil | 3.6 | 29.7 | 73.9 |
| Rest of Americas | 7.5 | 37.9 | 39.1 |
| Europe, except FSU* | 4.5 | 1.7 | 6.1 |
| Russia, other FSU | 7.4 | 71 | 33 |
| Non-oil Middle East and North Africa | 8.5 | 45.9 | 33.8 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 12 | 63.1 | 55.3 |
| Other oil producers | 6.8 | 25.9 | 9.9 |

*FSU = Former Soviet Union

Source: Ferrantino, Geiger and Tsigas, *The Benefits of Trade Facilitations – A modelling Exercise*. Based on 2007 baseline. See text and online Appendix for details.

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- Multi-track trade policy
 - Disconnect between 21st-century trade and 20th-century trade governance
 - Unilateral measures
 - WTO
 - RTAs


INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- Unilateral measures
 - Main driver of 1st-generation trade and FDI liberalisation; enabled GVCs in East Asia; but slowed down
 - Also main driver of 2nd-generation reforms
 - Even stronger economic *and* political case for unilateral liberalisation in GVC context

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- WTO
 - Mini-Doha: trade facilitation
 - Doha-plus: ITA II and digital economy cluster; services; FDI
 - Need for plurilateral (critical-mass) negotiations/agreements
 - Inside WTO or WTO 2.0?
 - Asia, esp. East Asia, in post-Doha WTO

Figure 3: Shifting to plurilaterals: how many additional countries?



Source: OECD (2006)

Notes: Total services includes public administration and defence, health and social services, private households services which are not shown separately in Figure 3.

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- RTAs in Asia
 - Proliferation of FTAs – from non-discriminatory liberalisation to discrimination; catch-up with other regions
 - WTO-plus in scope, but little depth
 - *Not* deep-integration FTAs; rather “trade-lite”
 - Conclusion: probably not diverted much trade, but not created much either

Box 3: Strength of ASEAN+1 FTAs, AFTA, ASEAN countries' bilateral FTAs, and US and EU FTAs in Asia

| FTA indicators Countries and regions | Tariff elimination | NTBs in goods | Services | Investment | Govt. Procurement |
|--|---|---|--|--|----------------------|
| AFTA/AEC | Comprehensive | Strong general commitment, weak implementation | Strong general commitment, weak specific commitments | Strong general commitment, weak specific commitments | Absent |
| Singapore FTAs | Comprehensive (less so for some FTA partners) | Strong in some FTAs | Generally GATS+, esp. with USA | Generally strong, esp. with USA | Generally GPA + |
| ASEAN countries' bilateral FTAs | Mixed. 90%+ elimination in some FTAs, big agriculture exemptions, long transition periods | Weak | Weak (barely GATS+) | Weak | Absent |
| ASEAN-China FTA | Middling. 90% elimination By 2012/15. 10% of tariffs 0-5% by 2018/20 | Weak | Weak (not GATS+) | Weak | Absent |
| ASEAN- Japan FTA | Mixed. 93% elimination by 2018/26, big agriculture exemptions, long transition periods, complex bilateral schedules | Weak | Not concluded | Not concluded | Absent |
| ASEAN-Korea FTA | Fairly strong. 95% elimination by 2012/2020. Agriculture exemptions | Weak | Weak (GATS compatible) | Weak | Absent |
| ASEAN-India FTA | Weak. <90% tariff elimination (80%for India) by 2016/2021. Big exclusion list, particularly in agriculture. Long transition periods. Complex bilateral schedules | Weak | Not covered yet | Not covered yet | Absent |
| ASEAN-Australia- NZ FTA | Fairly strong. 96% elimination by 2020. Complex bilateral schedules | Weak | Weak. Slightly GATS+, positive list | Weak-to-middling. Post-establishment disciplines, investor- state DSM, but no liberalisation | Absent |

Box 3: Strength of ASEAN+1 FTAs, AFTA, ASEAN countries' bilateral FTAs, and US and EU FTAs in Asia

| FTA indicators/ Countries and regions | Tariff elimination | NTBs in goods | Services | Investment | Govt. Procurement |
|---|---|---|------------------------------------|--|--|
| US FTAs (with Singapore and Korea) | Comprehensive. Short transition periods, some agriculture products exempted (with Korea) | Strong | Strong (GATS++). Negative list | Strong. Negative list, pre/post establishment disciplines | GPA+ . Lower bid thresholds, negative list in services |
| EU-Korea FTA | Comprehensive. Short transition periods, some agriculture products exempted | Strong sector- specific disciplines | Middling .GATS+ , positive list | Basic framework, No investor-state DSM | Slightly GPA+ |

Box 3: Strength of ASEAN+1 FTAs, AFTA, ASEAN countries' bilateral FTAs, and US and EU FTAs in Asia

| FTA indicators/ Countries and regions | Intellectual Property | Trade Facilitation | Standards (MRAs, SPS, TBT) | Rules of Origin | Dispute settlement |
|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| AFTA/AEC | Not TRIPS+ | Strong commitments, weak implementation | Some MRAs, weak implementation | Simple .40%RVC | Quite strong commitments but weak in practice |
| Singapore FTAs | TRIPS+ , esp. with USA | Strong | Strong | Varied. Differs between FTAs | Strong. Investor-state DSM |
| ASEAN countries' bilateral FTAs | Not TRIPS+ | Weak | Weak | Varied. Differs between FTAs | Weak-to-middling |
| ASEAN-China FTA | Not TRIPS+ | Weak | Weak | Simple. 40% RVC | Similar to WTO in theory |
| ASEAN-Japan FTA | Not TRIPS+ | Weak | Weak | Quite restrictive. 40%RVC plus product-specific rules | Similar to WTO in theory |
| ASEAN-Korea FTA | Not TRIPS+ | Weak | Weak | 40%RVC plus product- specific rules | Similar to WTO in theory |
| ASEAN-India FTA | Not TRIPS+ | Weak | Weak | Restrictive. 35% RVC, CTSH, product-specific rules | Similar to WTO in theory |
| ASEAN-Australia-NZ FTA | Slightly TRIPS+ (copyrights and transparency) | Weak | Weak | 40%RVC plus product- specific rules | Similar to WTO plus investor-state DSM |
| US FTAs (with Singapore and Korea) | TRIPS+ | Strong | Quite strong | Product-specific, restrictive | Strong. Investor-state DSM |
| EU-Korea FTA | Slightly TRIPS+. Strong on copyright and GIs | Strong | Strong | Product-specific, restrictive | Strong |

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- **Regional economic integration (cont.)**
 - Wider regional integration initiatives: Northeast Asian FTA; ASEAN plus 3; ASEAN plus 6 (RCEP); TPP; EU-US; EU-Japan
 - The case for a region-wide FTA
 - But it could compromise GVCs
 - Intra-Asian regionals unlikely to be deep-integration oriented; rather follow trade-light pattern
 - What about TPP?
 - How to multilateralise regionalism?

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

- Conclusion
 - GVCs reinforce case for free trade – not forgetting geopolitics
 - They link regional and global integration – not either/or
 - Potential geographical and sectoral expansion
 - But will centripetal forces (onshoring) be greater?
 - Scope for international policy cooperation, but has to rely mainly on unilateral liberalisation