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ONLINE WARFARE & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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» International political economy of internet

Assumption that cyber security is "the most serious economic and national security challenge we face as a nation"...

- » ...modern societies are 'not prepared', 'ridiculous to suggest anything else'
- » Dissemination beyond the pace of domestic and international regulation
 - Half bn people joins the internet before a national legislation can be passed
 - China being the largest internet economy in the world since 2008

...or uneasiness, concern about moving from a uni- to multipolar world

I leading vulnerability of open and connected societies:

- » Center for New American Security claims approximately 1.8 billion cyber attacks of varying sophistication targeting Congress and federal agencies each month
- » \$300 billion worth of trade secrets are stolen on annual basis in the United States, according to the US Cyber Command
- » Not an US-centric issue; In China, cyber-attacks doubled between 2011 and 2012

... or overselling the threat of internet on foreign policy

- » Does the debate exaggerate soft powers and digital diplomacy
- » At the height of Arab Spring, less than 15 000 registered users of twitter in Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia
- » Surprising share of population in favour of government internet control



» Ethics of war - yet few occasions qualifying as 'war'

Realist's worldview has dictated collected policy response:

- The next Pearl Harbor is likely to be a cyber attack going after our grid
 - Leon Panetta, then CIA director now Secretary of Defence
- Attacks against networks that control the critical infrastructure in this country could wreak havoc"
 - Denis Blair, Director of National Intelligence
- » Real-time response simulations show they 'pose genuine threats' to telco networks, electricity grid & trading
- » Online security now a part of the defence doctrine
 - US establishing a 'cyber command'
 - Now part of strategic concept of NATO (Lisbon Declaration 2010)

> As of yet, there are very few cases of 'pure' cyber warfare.

- » Cyber-terrorism', '-crime' or '-espionage', and no clear-cut case of outright wars:
- » Only two close calls (out of supposed billion cases per month):
 - Estonia targeted in 2007 for three weeks by allegedly state-sponsored Russian hackers, though this was never proven. Using DDoS-attacks, the cyber-attacks targeted the websites of Estonian parliament, government ministries, political parties, media and banks
 - 2008 South Ossetia War, Georgian news media websites were targeted by (allegedly) state-backed Russian hackers. Government websites moved to Blogspot

No evidence to date that a sovereign state can be durably paralysed by cyber-attacks or can lose a war in cyber-space

- » End-users may face potential cyber-security issues, however cyber-incidents that affect entire networks or critical infrastructure are quite uncommon
- » Question whether openness as a threat or acting as deterrent?

Why refer to 'cyber threats' as war?



» Asymmetrical threats leading to disproportionate response

Online threats follow the pattern of all asymmetrical threats

- » Like all asymmetrical threats, levelling the playing field between the hegemonic and emerging/marginalised powers or non-state actors (NSAs)
- » Which presents a threat with non-existent defence capabilities
- » No deterrence from retaliation
 - No mechanism like the nuclear deterrent (mutually assured destruction) leading to START I/II talks
- » 'Known unknowns' unleashing disproportionate political and popular responses

Like asymmetrical threats, 'cyber war/terrorism' not governed by international law

- » Rule of war (Hague convention, Geneva Conventions) inapplicable, aggression or behaviour between sovereign states and armed forces
- » No concept of 'just war' neither jus ad bellum or jus in bello
- » Non-binding language of co-operation in international treaties, so far never put into practice
- » Governed by unilateral or extraterritorial application of national law (cf. maritime law)

Reactions dispersing borders between culture, international trade and telecommunication

- » Open networks perceived as a strategic resources, view of internet as a deployable asset
 - Concept of information sovereignty
- Action and response targeting commerce rather than government or personal entities
 Increasing classification of 'strategic' or 'vital interests' especially in a time of crisis

W(h)ither multilateralist order?

» UNSC/UNGA, OHCHR, UNESCO, ITU, WTO/UNCTAD, WIPO, IGF ... INTERPOL



» Commerce and internet security

Stuxnet incident, 2010

- » Allegedly caused the processing units in Iranian nuclear facilities in Bushehr and Natanz to spin out of control and self-destruct, thereby delaying Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons.
- » Stuxnet infected several controller equipment designed for use in industrial automation made by a German manufacturer

Operation "Aurora", 2010

- » Google announced that it "detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google"
- » Google stated: "Primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists", Google withdrawing (or not) from Mainland China
- » However, the attack also aimed to gain the proprietary source codes from United States companies and resulted in intellectual property theft in commercial banking, chemicals, software and ICT devices manufacturing

Target, accomplice or both?



» Policy response: Balkanisation, decoupling interdependencies

» Going offline

- Great Firewall of China or liquid cement
- State monopolies e.g. news mediation, including financial news (Thomson Reuters)

» Investment restrictions

- Cttee on Foreign Investments in US (Cfius) against Huawei, ZTE
 - 2008: Huawei forced to give up 16.5% stake bid in American network equipment maker 3Com
 - 2010: Huawei and ZTE excluded from bidding for large network contracts from Sprint Nextel (even though the companies offered better terms than their competitors)
 - 2011: Huawei forced to give up plans for \$2 million purchase of patents from Californian start-up 3Leaf
- Ban of Chinese handsets in India
- Foreign equity caps on investments in telecoms (China, US, certain EU member states)

» Scrutiny of state-owned enterprises and subsidies

The EU-China megaphone diplomacy of 2012

» Indigenous innovation (China, India)

Forced surrender of source codes and other forms of intellectual property

» Control of public procurement (MLPS)

- The scheme covers 60-70% (\$35.2-\$41.0 billion) spent on ICT in the public and private sector
- Health care, education, finance and banking, energy, telecoms, insurance and transportation fall under the purview of the MLPS

» Data localisation rules or local content requirement

- ICT equipment in India, 80% of domestic demand to be met by local producers
- Blackberry in Saudi Arabia, UAE
- Safe harbour under EU DPD

» Encryption

Ban of foreign encryption technology in China, India



» Diplomacy and ethics

First, it starts with a misguided assumption or consensus of the commentariat:

- » "Oppressive regimes would never be able to control the internet" but No "End of History" in sight
- » No clean or arithmetic link between online/economic development and more ethical societies (modernisation theory)

Second, ethics is not a vital objective of digital foreign policy:

- » Geopolitics today largely shaped by economic statecraft
 - The increasing market competition between countries rather than individual companies put 'economics back at the heart of their foreign policies' — 'The US global leadership and economic strength is packaged deal' that feed from each other
- » Coalitions or behaviour not based on aligning views on normative behaviour, morals or ethics

Third, digital diplomacy for open internet has so far failed:

- » From Haystack episode to 'arming' NGOs on the ground
- » Reciprocated scepticism against open internet by legitimate and democratic governments
 - France in G8 Deauville
 - WCIT against the multi-stakeholder model
 - First cases of extraterritorial application of censorship starting in Europe
- » Failure of economic sanctions, embargoes
- » Lack of leverage from 'European values' and strategic partnerships

Fourth, unethical behaviour by states not (cannot be) addressed:

- » Sovereign, national interests before human interests
 - Liberal morality and ethical dilemmas of foreign policy shaped in 1960/70s
 - Theories questioning realist thought on individuals and states
- » Limited success of theoretical principles or universalism:
 - UN Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
 - Unenforceable, largely incapable of addressing political and religious censorship off & online
 - Erga omnes



» No ethical balancing but an economic diplomacy of proportionality?

Traditionally no ethical considerations in international economic policy or law

» Conditionality in trade agreements, impractical or without effect

World Trade Organization (established in 1994) following GATT (1947)

- » Dispute settlement enforced through settlements and trade retaliation
- » There is no ethics test in trade law
 - · General exceptions (GATT art XX; GATS art XIV) for maintaining public morals and public order
 - ...given no 'arbitrary' and 'unjustifiable' discrimination, but jurisprudence provides that Members are free to set whatever moral standard they like (China—audiovisuals)
 - Technical barriers to trade not more restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective (incl. national security), taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create
 - Security exceptions (GATT XXI; GATS XIV bis)
 - Military contracts, limiting disclosure of security interests
 - Measures in times of war and emergency in international relations
 - Obligations under the UN

Closest resemblance of ethics test in foreign policy: Proportionality under trade law

- » Objective at discretion of members but
 - Must show that 'genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed' to 'fundamental interest' of society
 - Necessary for moral, order or national security
 - Least restrictive measure reasonably available for the level of morals pursued genuine alternatives
 - Established in case law over Korean restrictions on beef, US online gambling, Chinese audiovisual products
- » Enforceable: close to 100% compliance rate but some inherent weaknesses

Cyber security actions/responses as hidden trade barriers

- » Primary an economic (protectionism) or civil security problem
 - Re-dressed as a foreign policy instrumentation?

